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In his new book, Phenomenological Bioethics (Routledge 2018), the Swedish philosopher Fredrik 
Svenaeus aims to show how the continental tradition of phenomenology (represented by writers 
such as Heidegger, Edith Stein, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Gadamer, or Hans Jonas) can enrich 
bioethical debates by adding an important, but often ignored perspective, namely that of the lived, 
first-person and second-person, experience. Phenomenology focuses not on supposedly objective, 
scientifically validated facts, but on the ‘life world’ of the individuals affected by a situation. A 
person’s life world consists of their experience of their own lived body (or “Leib”) and the meaning 
structures of their everyday world. A phenomenologically informed and oriented bioethics would 
seek to take those life worlds into account when considering what should be done in a particular 
ethically challenging situation. Svenaeus reminds us that there is generally more to an illness than 
just a malfunction of the body that can be causally explained and treated accordingly. What medical 
practitioners as well as the bioethicists who advise them need to do is try to understand 
empathically what matters to the patient and why, and how it is for them to be in that particular 
situation. Every disease that can be described and explained in purely medical terms is also an 
illness, experienced as such and in their own particular way by someone. Medicine is concerned 
with the relieving of human suffering, and rightly so, but a patient’s suffering must be seen as a 
personal and existential issue, something that both reflects and affects their specific being-in-the-
world. There are many different ways in which people can suffer. For Svenaeus, however, suffering 
is, in its most general terms, essentially a personal alienation: a break-down or erosion of the 
established meaning structures in a person’s life. It cannot be isolated and confined: for the 
suffering person their suffering affects their whole world. It changes everything, turns the world 
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upside down and into a hostile place what used to be a home. Accordingly, the goal of medicine is 
not (or should not be) primarily to restore the body’s normal functioning or alleviate bodily pain, 
but rather “to make the experienced body, world, and life story of the patient less alien” (xi). The 
proper goal of medicine is to allow us to once again be at home in our body and at home in our 
world. 
The fundamental insight that Svenaeus develops in his new book is that our illnesses are often, if 
not always, crises of meaning. The problem is not simply that we are in pain or that we can no 
longer do what we want to do and used to do. The problem is that we seem to have, as it were, lost 
our footing in the world, such that we are beginning to doubt that the things that used to matter to us 
really do matter. We are perfectly happy to go through painful experiences if it gets us somewhere 
(for instance when giving birth, or when exercising). What gets us down, what shatters our world to 
the core, is a suffering that seems to have no point and that alienates us from our own body and 
therefore, since we are our body (meaning that our existence is essentially an embodied one), from 
ourselves. Drawing on Freud’s famous essay, Svenaeus calls this experience of self-alienation, this 
feeling of being betrayed by one’s own body, uncanny. “The body is my basic home-being, and 
therefore alienation within the bodily domain is a particularly uncanny experience, compared to 
other ways of being alienated” (38). Healthcare professionals need to understand this and find ways 
to reverse the process. 
Svenaeus cites anorexia nervosa as an illness that shows very clearly this uncanny alienation from 
one’s own being. The nature of this illness is such that adequate treatment requires much more than 
just the usual measures (coercion and surveillance) to prevent the patient from continuing their life-
threatening starvation behaviour. To help the person afflicted with the disease their alienated body 
experience needs to be understood and corrected, allowing them to find or develop a personal 
identity “that is possible to live and be at home with” (52). Yet even though Svenaeus’ analysis 
seems plausible in the case of anorexia nervosa, one may wonder whether it is indeed the case that 
all illnesses, or even most illnesses, can be better understood when they are regarded as processes of 
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(body, self, and world) alienation. Anorexia nervosa seems to be rather special in this respect. 
Suffering may always be alienating in some way, but rarely is the experience of an alienation the 
actual root of the problem as it seems to be the case here. It may still be true, though, that “one 
needs to feel and understand the fears, thoughts, and wishes of patients in order to help them in the 
best possible way” (55). What is needed is empathy, not detachment, Svenaeus maintains. But is it 
really? Of course we all want to be treated not as medical cases, but as persons, with sympathy and 
compassion. This goes without saying. But do healthcare professionals really always need to 
understand what it is like for the patient to be in the situation they are in in order to properly help 
them? Are all medical problems on some fundamental level life-world problems? Surely it depends 
on the nature of the problem. And are we not asking too much of our doctors and nurses when we 
demand that they always try “to understand the whole life situation and identity of the patient” (73) 
and what makes their life “worth or not worth living” (74)?  
It seems to me that such a holistic approach is only needed either when the medical problem in 
question originates in the patient’s life situation and identity, or when the problem at hand is not 
solely or not primarily a medical problem, but an ethical one. To be sure, there are many such 
problems, mostly life and death situations where to make the right decision we need to know 
exactly what is at stake for this particular patient. For others this may not be necessary. The real 
target of Svenaeus’ phenomenological challenge, however, is the kind of mindless ethical 
proceduralism that is so easy to fall into when we let our actions be guided solely by principlism: 
“Ethics can very easily become pure procedure, a game of applying pre-made principles to 
situations in which moral guidance is asked for (or, at least, pretended to be asked for). Applied 
ethics in such versions hides itself behind an image of neutrality, pretending not to advocate any 
specific image of the good human life but instead providing the medics with objective advice.” (95) 
Such objective, neutral advice is indeed not possible. A more substantive idea of the good life is 
always present somewhere in the background of medical decision-making, and the 
phenomenological approach advocated in this book may well help raise awareness of those ideas. 
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However, can it also help us make the right decisions? I have my doubts because I am not sure 
whether phenomenology can help us determine how things should be. Take for example the 
question of how we should treat human embryos. Svenaeus suggests that the real concern here is 
“not about the life or death of individual embryos but about the way medical technologies affect our 
everyday being-in-the-world and attitudes towards life” (104). Maybe he is right. However, the 
problem with this is that all that the phenomenological approach can tell us is what those attitudes 
are and, more specifically, whether we feel alienated by or at home with the way our world is 
shaped and transformed by those technologies. Yet we can feel at home with a lot of things, and we 
may learn to feel at home with things that alienate us initially. Does a phenomenological approach 
allow us to make the judgement that we should not be at home with certain things? That we should 
be alienated? 
Or take abortion and the question whether (or when) it is ethically permissible. Svenaeus 
emphasises the importance of the pregnant woman’s experience, arguing that what the pregnant 
woman feels is not that her body has been invaded by some alien intruder, but rather that she is now 
in intimate contact with a child-to-be “who demands protection and support to develop and 
flourish” (120). This is why, allegedly, the embryo deserves our protection. For the same reason the 
child’s birth is such a significant event. Through birth “the baby presents itself to the world (…) and 
this ushers in a different kind of responsibility than the foetus in the womb is capable of appealing 
for.” (138) Personally, I am inclined to agree with this assessment. However, what strikes me as 
problematic is that what the embryo or foetus is seems to be regarded as completely irrelevant for 
how it should be treated by us. The only thing that matters is how it appears. This shows the limits 
of the phenomenological approach: appearances change. There is no one way (and, more 
importantly, no right way) to experience things. Different women will feel differently about their 
child. Some may well feel it as an alien intruder. Should we then really make the protection that we 
grant the unborn child dependent on the way its mother feels about it?  
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Svenaeus’ analysis of the ethics of organ transplantation faces similar problems. “A 
phenomenological exploration of organ transplantation will be tied to fundamental questions about 
what type of relationship we have to our own bodies, as well as what kind of relationship we have 
to each other as human beings sharing the same being-in-the-world as embodied creatures.” (124) 
Those relationships are indeed important to consider. Yet they, too, can change, and it is not clear to 
me whether a phenomenological bioethics can give us any guidance as to how those relationships 
should be. On what grounds could it do that? Svenaeus points out that heart transplants are different 
from liver transplants because the heart means something different to us, which is no doubt true. 
Yet once again, meanings can change. They do all the time. Svenaeus favours an ethics of sharing 
organs with others as an acknowledgement of our common humanity, and I very much like this 
idea. However, does such an ethics really follow from a phenomenological understanding of body 
parts as “not just another type of things to be traded but, rather, (…) fundamental parts of our self-
being” (136)? Could we not just as well conclude that precisely for that reason we should not 
support any form of institutionalized organ transfer? 
 
